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Introduction
Analysing economic insecurity has become quite common recently, when investigating issues 
such as the rise of populism or the anxieties of workers. Populism and populist leaders have 
been grabbing the headlines of the international media for the better part of the 2010s. The 
election of Donald Trump in the United States and of Jair Bolsonaro in Brasil, the BREXIT 
referendum and the emergence of Boris Johnson as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 
the growing popularity of populist discourse and populist parties such as the AfD (Alternative 
für Deutschland) in Germany, the National Rally (Rassemblement national) in France, or the 
Northern League (Lega Nord) in Italy, etc., have made populist themes as well as the theme of 
populism a common sight in politics.
At the same time, the reasons for the popularity of populist parties are somewhat unclear and 
contested.  Related  to  this,  Guiso,  Herrera,  Morelli,  & Tommaso  (2018)  and  Inglehart  & 
Norris (2016) were interested in the connection between economic insecurity and populism, 
while  Algan, Papaionnaou, Guriev, & Passari (2017); Dustmann et al., (2017) looked at the 
connections between trust and populism. However, the causal links found by these authors are 
somewhat at odds with each other (as will be discussed in the next section). The reason for 
this is, that different timespans and countries were examined in the afore mentioned studies, 
and more importantly,  slightly different concepts of economic insecurity  were used,  when 
measuring the impact thereof on populism. 
This  article,  while  focusing  on  economic  insecurity,  has  two  main  parts  and  two  main 
objectives. First, the article will provide a wider conceptual context, in which populism and 
economic insecurity is situated, focusing not only on conceptual challenges and the variations 
in definitions, but also on problems of operationalisation. Second, the article will introduce 
some of the major debates within the literature, which have emerged when conceptualising 
economic insecurity. The finding of the article shows that although economic insecurity has 
been used in many contexts and related to diverse themes, two common points have emerged 
within the literature: a focus on the risks that people face, and anxiety as a consequence of this 
risk. These two variables are useful when attempting to analyse economic insecurity as one of 
the root causes of populist demand. Given the vast literature available, the article makes no 
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attempt  at  being  exhaustive:  it  will  provide  an  account  of  the  dominant  concepts  and 
approaches in the field of literature concerned.
The relevance of economic insecurity
When assessing the root causes of populism, Inglehart & Norris (2016) analysed two possible 
reasons  for  its  emergence:  the  economic  inequality  and  the  cultural  backlash  arguments. 
According  to  the  economic  inequality  thesis,  “rising  economic  insecurity  and  social 
deprivation among the left-behinds has fuelled popular resentment of the political  classes” 
(Inglehart & Norris, 2016, p. 2), which is exploited by populist leaders and parties. If the 
economic  insecurity  argument  holds,  this  would mean,  according to  Inglehart  and Norris 
(2016), that support for populism should be observed among those, who have lost the most 
due  to  globalisation,  technological  changes  and the structural  changes  of  economies.  The 
initial results are mixed in the sense that they do find a relationship between populist support 
and  economic  insecurity  amongst  the  petty  bourgeoisie  (self-employed  people,  small 
businesses etc.)  but not amongst the unskilled manual  workers. In contrast  to  Inglehart  & 
Norris (2016), Guiso et al. (2018) found that economic insecurity has been the most dominant 
reason for frustration-induced abstention from voting in  elections,  and the leading motive 
behind the demand for populist parties. They argue that systemic economic security, which 
the  traditional  incumbent  parties  have  found  hard  to  address,  make  their  voters  turn  to 
alternative  parties  who  promise  redistributive  changes.  In  a  more  recent  article,  Guiso, 
Herrera, Morelli, & Sonno (2019, p. 101) argue that an increase of economic insecurity drives 
up the populist  vote  through two mechanisms:  anti-immigrant  tendencies  and distrust  for 
traditional politics.
A slightly different theme is analysed by Algan et al. (2017), who focus on the impact of the 
global financial  crisis on trust and on voting for anti-establishment parties. They find that 
crisis-driven economic insecurity (mainly via changes in the level of unemployment) during 
the financial crisis, and the inability of European institutions to deal with it, led to falling trust 
in national parliaments and European institutions, and to the emerging popularity of populist 
parties. As unemployment has increased during the economic crisis, so has trust decreased 
with it in Europe during the financial crisis (Foster & Frieden, 2017). Dustmann et al. (2017) 
show that older and less educated people are more likely to trust European institutions and 
national parliaments, and are more likely to vote for a populist party; it is the other social 
segments that account for much of the loss of trust. Mayer, Rovny, Rovny, & Sauger (2015)
show that focusing only on unemployment to determine a rise in economic insecurity may be 
wrong, as employed people can be differentiated between as insiders (occupying well-paid 
and stable jobs) as well as outsiders (facing increasing levels of social and economic risk). 
While analysing the status of outsiders Rovny & Rovny (2017, p. 181) found that depending 
on how outsiders are defined they could turn out to be supporters of the radical right (defined 
on the  basis  of  occupational  class  group risk)  or  the  radical  left  (on the basis  of  current 
employment status).
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Rehm, Hacker and Schlesinger (2012) found that if economic risk is uncorrelated with income 
(i.e., if risk is inclusive in society), there will be a universal demand for policies promising 
change. Furthermore, adverse economic shocks have a major effect on increasing the populist 
vote.  Probably  one  of  the  most  comprehensive  studies  has  been  conducted  by  Funke, 
Schularick,  &  Trebesch  (2016),  who  find  that  political  polarisation  in  the  19th and  20th 
centuries have increased after financial crises, and that far-right parties have gained, in the 
five years following crises, an increase of 30% in vote share relative to pre-crises levels. 
Voters are systematically lured by the rhetoric of the far-right which is often nationalistic or 
xenophobic, while the far-left profits less from financial unpredictability. 
What seems to be a common theme in the literature mentioned previously is, that adverse 
economic events will have an impact on the trust citizens have towards both their national 
governments, and in the European case, towards the institutions of the European Union. This 
can result in an increase in the vote-share of anti-establishment parties, both at the national 
and at  the European level.  It  is  also understandable that,  as a result  of adverse economic 
events, individuals have become economically more insecure: fears of job loss due to imports, 
the  fear  of  immigration  and  automation  coupled  with  the  effects  of  the  financial  crisis 
manifesting  in  the  decline  of  the middle  class  and the defaulting  mortgages,  have  led  to 
emotionally less secure voters, dissatisfied with existing parties and age-old solutions. 
Conceptualising and reviewing the literature on economic insecurity
The literature on economic insecurity is quite diverse: Anderson and Pontusson (2007, p. 212) 
argue that in many cases it is used as an umbrella term for the “different manifestations of 
material  well-being”,  and  its  meaning  can  range  from  job-related  concerns  to  personal-
income-based issues. This is also apparent from the definitions below: 
 Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2013, p. 1018) defines economic insecurity as “the anxiety 
produced by the possible exposure to adverse economic events and by the anticipation 
of the difficulty to recover from them”. 
 Jacobs (2007, p. 1) states that “economic insecurity is perhaps best understood as the 
intersection between “perceived” and “actual” downside risk.” 
 Dominitz  and Manski (1997, p. 264) state  that “an individual's  sense of economic 
insecurity may be thought to arise from his or her perceptions of the risk of economic 
misfortune”. 
 Western  et  al.,  (2012,  p.  341) conceptualise  economic  insecurity  as  “the  risk  of 
economic loss faced by workers and households as they encounter the unpredictable 
events of social life.” 
 Osberg (1998, p. 17), cited in Osberg & Sharpe (2014, p. 53), directs attention to “the 
anxiety  produced  by  a  lack  of  economic  safety  –  i.e.  by  an  inability  to  obtain 
protection against subjectively significant potential economic losses”. 
 Hacker  et  al.  (2014) believe  that  three  features  of  human  thinking  and  market 
dynamics impact on economic insecurity: loss aversion, difficulty in assessing relevant 
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economic contingencies and safeguarding oneself against  them, and the incomplete 
character of private insurance markets.
One common denominator among these definitions is the risks people face and the anxiety 
experienced as a consequence of these risks. Individuals will feel insecure if they believe that 
there  is  a  major  and “unavoidable  downside economic  risk”  (Osberg,  2015,  p.  7).  In  the 
meantime, the above-mentioned authors all identify different causal chains in regard to how 
economic insecurity arises, as this will be detailed below. In the remainder of this section, the 
article  will  differentiate  between  the  literature  which  uses  economic  insecurity  as  an 
explanatory variable for explaining populism, and economic insecurity used as a response 
variable (an outcome to be explained).
The diversity  of  the literature  is  also  visible  when attempting  to  operationalise  economic 
insecurity:  those  authors  who  have  used  economic  insecurity  as  a  tool  to  explore  the 
relationship between economic factors and populism have not settled on one common way of 
measurement. Algan et al. (2017, p. 319) measure insecurity as a change in the unemployment 
rate,  Inglehart & Norris (2016, p. 45) use reported difficulty of living on current household 
incomes,  Dustmann et al. (2017) use per capita income and the unemployment rate as the 
economic indicators to test insecurity, while  Guiso  et al.  (2018, p. 15) measure economic 
insecurity by looking at three factors: unemployment in the previous three years; financial 
distress (finding it hard to live on the current income), and by a complex indicator used to 
assess, inter alia, exposure to the impact of globalisation and skill level. 
The  same is  true  for  the  authors  who have  conceptualised  and operationalised  economic 
insecurity independent from the idea of using it as an indicator to explain the rise of populism: 
they have not settled on a uniform way of measuring it. Osberg & Sharpe (2014, p. 71) use the 
Index of  Economic  Well-Being (IEWB),  a  weighted  index,  which  measures  four  factors: 
livelihood security, security from cost of illness, security from widowhood and security in old 
age.  Hacker et al. (2014, p. 6) also develop their own index, the Economic Security Index 
(ESI), incorporating three dimensions to measure economic security: income loss, medical 
spending shocks and the buffering effects of financial wealth. Anderson & Pontusson (2007, 
p. 228) associate economic insecurity with job insecurity, and measure it with individual-level 
survey data, estimating the probability of losing one’s current job, estimating one’s ability to 
find another job, and the availability of income during unemployment.  Scheve & Slaughter 
(2004,  p.  665) measure  economic  insecurity  by  responses  to  a  specific  question  on  job 
security of the British Household Panel Survey, while Burgoon & Dekker (2010, p. 131) use 
two types of survey answers to gauge economic insecurity: one relating to the respondent’s 
subjective job security, the second to the individual’s subjective income security.  Bossert & 
D’Ambrosio (2013, p. 1019) apply a measurement which “identifies economic insecurity in 
terms of the current wealth level multiplied by minus one plus weighted sums of the wealth 
gains (losses) experienced in the past.”
In  the  following  sections,  the  article  introduces  some  of  the  major  debates  within  the 
literature, and eventually proposes a definition for future use.
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Is economic insecurity caused by local/regional problems or by globalisation?
A collection of articles in the early 21st century attempted to analyse the new, but already 
visible effects of globalisation on workers. These effects were captured by focusing on how 
the  security  of  workers  changed,  due  to  the  new  causal  mechanisms  of  deepening 
international  economic  integration.  Scheve  &  Slaughter  (2004) conceptualised  economic 
insecurity  as  the  perception  of  labour  market  status.  They argued that  a  vast  majority  of 
people rely more on income from labour than from capital, and if the labour status of workers 
is threatened, because of increased global competition, workers will feel more insecure. The 
authors, using the British Household Panel Survey (from 2001), were interested in finding out 
about whether greater foreign direct investment (FDI) can increase labour demand elasticities, 
and as a result of it, worker insecurity, due to volatile wages. In their model they find that 
people  are  more  insecure  if  they  are  more  educated,  in  households  with  low  income, 
unionised and working in a sector with high unemployment. Furthermore, workers, employed 
in sectors where FDI is present, report higher insecurity, which may be because multinational 
companies can more easily substitute workers and production among different locations. To 
the contrary if labour markets are less flexible: there workers may worry less about job losses. 
In the meantime,  globalisation  may also reduce the capacities  of national  governments  to 
provide for social protection and to counter the negative effects of economic integration.
Burgoon and Dekker (2010), while also connecting economic insecurity to labour conditions, 
expose a different causal chain: they argue that the usage of flexible working hours increases 
economic insecurity amongst workers. Based on a Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2001, 
carried out across 15 European countries, the authors argue that the prevalence of part-time 
employment  and  temporary  employment  causes  feelings  of  job  insecurity  and  income 
insecurity,  as  these  types  of  jobs  are  heavily  dependent  on  business  cycles  and  increase 
demand for social policy assistance, even as these welfare transfers and services might not be 
forthcoming from governments.  
One of the most detailed  conceptualisations  of job insecurity  is  offered by  Anderson and 
Pontusson (2007). Their paper conceptualises the components of affective job insecurity (the 
anxiety over the fear of losing one’s job) into three parts: cognitive job insecurity,  labour 
market insecurity and income insecurity. According to the authors, cognitive job insecurity is 
made up of three components: labour market conditions (e.g. how secure workers are in their 
current employment position); individual employability attributes (e.g. how valuable workers 
are  for  their  employers),  and  institutionalised  employment  protection.  Labour  market 
insecurity refers to the likelihood the individual can find a job and depends on labour market 
conditions,  individual  employability  attributes  and labour market policies.  Finally,  income 
insecurity refers to the prospects of income replacement provided by the state, insurance or 
family.  The  expectation  is  that  the  stronger  the  welfare  state  is,  the  lower  affective  job 
insecurity  will  be.  The  authors  find,  based  on  individual-level  survey  data  from  the 
International Social Survey Program (ISSP) conducted in 1997, that more educated workers 
and workers in non-manual occupations feel more secure in their current job and are more 
optimistic  about  finding  a  new one  if  necessary.  High  unemployment  rates  lead  to  high 
cognitive job insecurity, while rising unemployment leads to more pessimism about new job 
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prospects.  The  authors  also  suggest  different  pathways  for  the  government  to  reduce 
insecurity,  through  restricting  the  ability  of  employers  to  fire  workers  to  improving 
employability programmes and providing unemployment compensation.
The conceptual work of Western et al. (2012) also connects economic insecurity to domestic 
events,  and  argues  that  while  economic  inequality  describes  variation  in  the  level  of 
socioeconomic status, economic insecurity calls for a more dynamic approach. The authors 
specify  four  types  of  “adverse  events”,  which  should  be  analysed  to  find  out  whether 
economic insecurity is increasing as a result of them. Western et al. (2012) do not investigate, 
what the cause of the adverse events were, only if they were present or not. The adverse 
events in question are: job loss and threat of unemployment, family instability and healthcare 
issues. These authors also stress that if a country possesses well-functioning institutions, the 
risks attributed to adverse events can be shifted or reduced, which in turn reduces economic 
insecurity experienced by citizens.
Is economic insecurity objective and/or subjective economic risk?
The issue of whether economic insecurity should be conceptualised as objective or subjective 
economic risk is complicated. One of the reasons why there are two sides to this argument is 
that,  while  it  is  not  easy  to  settle  for  a  single  concept  for  the  interpretation  economic 
insecurity,  it  is  even more difficult  to operationalise  it.  Any form of operationalisation is 
heavily dependent on available data, which in some cases may influence the way researchers 
conceptualise the term in the first place. For instance, when measuring subjective risk, Scheve 
& Slaughter (2004, p. 665) use the British Household Panel Survey, and measure responses to 
the question of “how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with this particular aspect of your own 
present job: job security” on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 meaning “completely satisfied” and 7 
meaning “not  satisfied  at  all”.  Burgoon & Dekker  (2010,  p.  131) use  the  Eurobarometer 
survey from 2001 to test whether respondents feel that their job is secure, or how they judge 
whether their income is secure, on a 1 to 5 scale. Anderson & Pontusson (2007, p. 217) use 
the  International  Social  Survey  Program,  and  measure  responses  to  three  questions:  to 
measure  cognitive  job insecurity,  respondents  were asked to answer a question over how 
secure they think their job is on a scale from 1 to 5. To test the labour market insecurity of 
individuals, the respondents were asked “How easy or difficult do you think it would be for 
you to find an acceptable job?”, with answers ranked from 1 to 5. To measure affective job 
insecurity,  respondents  were asked:  “Do you worry about  the  possibilities  of  losing your 
job?”, with four available options for answers.
In the meantime, in one of the earliest works on economic insecurity,  Dominitz & Manski 
(1997,  p.  262-263) found  that  the  perceptions  of  short-term  economic  insecurity  are 
influenced by the availability of health insurance, the chances of getting burgled, and the risk 
of  job  loss.  They  investigated  this  by  looking  at  responses  to  the  Survey  of  Economic 
Expectations on health insurance: "What do you think is the percent chance that you will have 
health insurance coverage 12 months from now?";  on burglary: "What do you think is the 
percent chance that someone will break into your home and steal something, during the next 
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12 months?"; and on job loss: "What do you think is the percent chance that you will lose 
your job during the next 12 months?".  Inglehart & Norris (2016, p. 33) use the European 
Social Survey’s question about subjective feeling for the household’s income and whether 
they are 1) living comfortably on present income; 2) coping on present income; 3) finding it 
difficult on present income and 4) finding it very difficult on present income – to thus capture 
subjective economic insecurity.
While the majority of articles mentioned up to this point focused on economic security by 
acknowledging, that it is partially due to the individuals’ subjective attitudes and how they 
perceive risk,  Hacker et al. (2014) created an indicator, the Economic Security Index (ESI), 
which  measures  the  changing  economic  circumstances  of  individuals,  and  not  their 
perceptions thereof. The authors focus on those aspects which are most important in the lives 
of U.S. citizens: the likelihood of household income declines of 25% or higher, the probability 
of medical expenses, and the capacity of households to financially deal with these events. The 
authors  use  the  Survey  of  Income  and  Program  Participation  (SIPP)  and  the  Current 
Population Survey (CPS), and find that the highest levels of insecurity are experienced by 
those with limited education, racial minorities, young workers and single parent households. 
Bossert & D’Ambrosio (2013) also use an objective measurement method, which focuses on 
the individual’s changes in wealth, by taking the current wealth level and multiplying it by 
minus one, plus the weighted sums of the wealth gains (or losses) experienced in the past. 
Recent experiences are given a higher weight than experiences in the more distant past. In 
yet-unpublished work, Bossert, Clark, D’Ambrosio, & Lepinteur (2019) provide an update on 
their  previous article  by stating  that  weights  associated  with losses can differ  from those 
associated with gains. 
Osberg (2015) warns against the dangers of asking people directly, because responses can be 
sensitive  to  transient  events  (such as  terrorist  attacks  or  natural  catastrophes)  or  personal 
problems. Furthermore, cross-country comparison of the same questions is difficult because 
of cultural issues and role identities (e.g. a “man” often will, due to social expectations, not 
admit being insecure). He also believes, that using questionnaires with questions relating to 
the frequency of a particular worry, could capture best the anxiety experienced by individuals. 
In  addition,  we  do  not  live  in  a  world  of  perfect  information,  complete  and  perfectly 
competitive  markets:  anomalous  traits  and  behaviours,  such  as  financial  illiteracy,  loss-
aversion  and  irrational  decision-making  being  common.  Thus,  respondents  might  give 
incorrect answers when interviewed for a survey. For these reasons, Osberg & Sharpe (2014, 
p. 57) suggest using the IEWB (Index of Economic Well-Being) Economic Security Index, 
which is conceptually based on the probability of unemployment and the size of the financial 
loss it produces. The index is made up of four components (weighed differentially), relating to 
securities from unemployment, illness, single-parent poverty and old-age poverty. 
Using an interesting mixture of objective and subjective factors,  Guiso et al. (2018, p. 15)
capture  economic  insecurity  by looking at  three  indicators  from the ESS: 1)  whether  the 
respondent has experienced unemployment in the last five years; 2) whether the respondent 
experiences income difficulties (similar to Inglehart & Norris, 2016) and 3) the exposure of 
the respondent to globalisation. In this way, the authors factor in objective elements such as 
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unemployment and the impact  of globalisation,  and also the subjective experiences of the 
respondent.  An additional  control  variable  is  used to measure whether  respondents to the 
survey are fearing immigration and the resulting availability of cheap labour. 
Should economic insecurity be measured on the micro or the macro level?
The last major debate surrounding economic insecurity is centred on the issue of the level it  
should be measured at: the macro or the micro level. Those studies that rely on surveys as 
their  data source are using a micro-level subjective assessment of economic insecurity  by 
arguing that it is the “individual’s sense of economic insecurity”, which “may be thought to 
arise from his or her perception of the risk of economic misfortune”  (Dominitz & Manski, 
1997, p. 264). Similarly, Bossert & D’Ambrosio (2013) argue that it makes sense to focus on 
individual measures, because economic insecurity is experienced by the individual, and it is 
their economic memory of their economic past which influences their anxiety in the present. 
This approach is used among others by:  Anderson & Pontusson, 2007; Burgoon & Dekker, 
2010; Dominitz & Manski, 1997; Dustmann et al., 2017; Scheve & Slaughter, 2004. Western 
et al. (2012, p. 343-344) argue that even though the level of analysis should remain on the 
micro  level,  it  is  rather  the  households  which  should  be  analysed,  as  opposed  to  the 
individuals, because households are essentially pooling the member individuals’ risk, which 
may compensate for income losses. A household-level analysis is also used by Bossert et al., 
2019 and by Hacker et al., 2014.
Contrary to the previous authors, Osberg & Sharpe (2014) rely on macro-level data, as they 
believe  that  subjective  and self-reported data  on the micro level  and based on surveys is 
misleading. For instance, according to Osberg (2015, pp. 29–30) when asked about how much 
the population was worried about income in old age, as many as 25% of Hungarian and Polish 
respondents reported 10/10 on an anxiety scale.
Algan et al., (2017) use an intriguing mixture of micro and macro-level data for measuring 
trust  within  Europe:  they collect  macro  data  from the Eurostat  on the NUTS 2 level  for 
unemployment, and add individual level, survey-based data from the ESS. In this way, intra-
regional variations of unemployment, trust and beliefs are also captured. A similar method 
was  employed  by  Dustmann  et  al.  (2017,  p.  50),  matching  ESS  respondents’  region  of 
residence data to GDP per capita and unemployment rates from the relevant NUTS regions.
Conclusion
This article aimed at taking stock of the vast literature surrounding economic insecurity, to 
settle on a concept for the purposes of operationalisation. The issue of economic insecurity 
had been raised in the past in many different contexts:  to capture how labour insecurities 
impact on citizens; to capture the effects of globalisation on citizens; or, more recently, to 
explain  the  growing  popularity  of  populist  politicians.  One  common  feature  among  the 
definitions used by the literature(s) concerned is the focus on the risks people face, and the 
anxiety felt as a consequence of being exposed to these risks. 
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This paper identified three major debates within the literature: 1) whether economic insecurity 
is a result  of local economic developments,  or that of globalisation; 2) whether economic 
insecurity should be measured using objective or subjective measurement methods; and 3) 
whether economic insecurity should be measured by looking at data on the micro or the macro 
level. Much of the conceptualisation and subsequent analysis depends on data availability. 
While the European Social Survey (ESS) does provide bi-annual survey based information on 
some of the fears of voters, unfortunately it is not conducted in each and every EU country,  
nor is it  available  in certain waves for Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Slovakia and Romania from the 
Central  and  Eastern  European  region.  An  alternative  could  be  the  Eurobarometer  or  the 
Gallup World Polls surveys, however neither is asking the same questions relating to anxiety, 
in surveys taken before and after the financial crisis, and thus their usage is limited to panel-
data-based analysis. 
Based on the aforementioned considerations, the best concept may be the definition of Bossert 
& D’Ambrosio (2013, p. 1018), wherein economic insecurity is “the anxiety produced by the 
possible  exposure to  adverse economic events  and by the anticipation  of the  difficulty  to 
recover from them”. This definition, coupled with the operationalisation of Guiso et al. (2018, 
p. 15), can capture adverse events stemming from unemployment, living standards, and the 
possible impact from globalisation. Following this approach, both objective and subjective 
reasons can be found as to why the demand for populism is growing.
András Tétényi
Institute of World Economy, Corvinus University of Budapest
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